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Patrick Dove
THE NIGHT OF THE SENSES: LITERARY
(DIS)ORDERS IN NOCTURNO DE CHILE
En una noche oscura,
con ansias en amores inflamada,
(¡oh dichosa ventura!)
salı´ sin ser notada,
estando ya mi casa sosegada.
San Juan de la Cruz, ‘La noche oscura’
Over the course of the last decade, and particularly in the wake of his untimely death at
the age of fifty, the Chilean novelist Roberto Bolan˜o (1953–2003) has come to be
viewed by critics and reviewers as perhaps the greatest Latin American writer of his
generation and as a literary phenomenon rivaling the international impact of the Boom
writers of the 1960s (Garcı´a Ma´rquez, Fuentes, Vargas Llosa, Corta´zar).1 No doubt
Bolan˜o’s reputation as a poe`te maudit – which has been cultivated through his own
accounts of vagabondism and drug and alcohol abuse, together with his well-publicized
and broadly aimed attacks on Latin American writers and literary institutions – has
helped to bolster his critical reception outside the Spanish-speaking world, creating a
somewhat ironic situation in which a figure renowned for his iconoclastic attitudes and
positions emerges as an international representative of what we continue to call ‘Latin
American literature’. Although the question of Bolan˜o’s reception is interesting in its
own right, I only allude to it as a rhetorical point of departure for what will be my real
concern here: the relation between literary language, aesthetics and politics. I begin by
rehearsing some arguments advanced by the French thinker Jacques Rancie`re
concerning the politics of literary aesthetics, after which I will turn to a discussion of
Bolan˜o’s 2000 novel Nocturno de Chile, a literary treatment of the 1973–89 military
dictatorship.
Jacques Rancie`re’s recent books, which include such titles as Disagreement: Politics
and Philosophy, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible and The Flesh of
Words: The Politics of Writing, introduce new ways of looking at the intersection between
politics and aesthetics following the commencement of democratic political struggles in
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This intersection defines an epoch that
extends from the late eighteenth century through the present, and which Rancie`re
characterizes as the age of literature.
Let us begin by recalling a key distinction Rancie`re makes between ‘politics’ and
‘police’. Whereas ‘police’ refers to the forces and rationales that bestow order on and
administer social spaces such as a city-state or nation, politics happens when new voices
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emerge to disrupt the self-presentation of a self-defined whole, shaking up the
rationales that a given community employs in order to distribute goods, rights and
responsibilities among various members. Politics coincides with the appearance of what
Rancie`re calls ‘the part that has no part’. Such a (non)part gives rise to a politics insofar
as its demands establish a conjunction of the singular with the universal. When a group
not previously accorded full membership in the whole begins to claim rights that have
previously been acknowledged as belonging to everyone, this group both reasserts the
existence of the common while also calling attention to singularity within the whole –
for it has suddenly become clear that the whole is not identical to itself, that it is
divided and marked by dissymmetry.
Take, for example, the demos or common people as defined by Aristotle. The social
taxonomy of Aristotle’s Politics lists the oligoı¨ as possessing wealth, the aristoı¨ as
embodying virtue and the demos as enjoying freedom. Unlike wealth and virtue,
however, freedom is an empty quality that cannot truly be possessed by the demos –
both because freedom is in fact common to all and, in the particular case of the demos,
because it is merely the negative freedom that obtained once it was no longer
permissible to enslave debtors in Athens. However, it is when the demos ‘mis-
understands’ this empty freedom as meaning something more – something like real
equality – that we have politics understood as the appearance of the ‘part of those who
have no part’.2 I want to stress the importance of the term ‘appearance’, which
indicates where politics and aesthetics touch for Rancie`re. At the same time, its
function in Rancie`re’s argument marks a departure from what ‘appearance’ has meant
for the philosophical tradition from Plato through Hegel. I will return to this point
shortly.
The demos’s self-interpretation both is and is not a misunderstanding, and it
thereby points to an aporia at the heart of the political. On one hand the equation of
freedom with equality is groundless, since one can perfectly well attribute freedom to
this group without also granting them real equality. On the other hand, this self-
interpretation cannot not be grounded, in the sense that the demos’ capacity to
‘misunderstand’ – rather than slavishly following orders – is proof that they do indeed
have logos. ‘Misunderstanding’ names the origin of the political as a moment when the
self-presentation of the whole is interrupted through the appearance of its uncanny
double, the other within the one. It is far from certain that this unhomely excess could
easily be reinscribed within a dialectical narrative: indeed, for Rancie`re it would seem
that the emergence of the part that has no part must not become an object for dialectics,
for then its difference would cease to mean a disjunction within the whole and would
instead mean its having been incorporated into a greater administrative rationale or
police logic. Misunderstanding thus points up the absence of arkheˆ or first principle that
could provide a stable measure of the common and a secure ground for community,
and it thus cannot be grasped – or converted into a concept – by the traditional
resources of political philosophy. Indeed, it throws the entire architectonic enterprise
of political philosophy into question. The divisions and distributions that constitute any
given social order – the allotment of goods, rights and responsibilities to each
member; the distinction between what is private and what is public; the attunement of
a particular sensibility that informs what can be thought, heard and said – must locate
and address every particular member of the whole. And yet the appearance of the ‘part
of those who have no part’ exposes the fact that no accounting procedure can preclude
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the possibility of being unsettled by a remainder. Every count is already a miscount: not
because it falls more or less short of the true count but because calculus must employ
language, and language in turn silently introduces the possibility of being heard or used
otherwise. In Rancie`re’s words, ‘the wrong [that is articulated by the demos ] is not just
the class struggle, [not just] internal dissention to be overcome by giving the city its
principle of unity, by founding the city on the arkheˆ – starting point or basis – of
community. It is the very impossibility of arkheˆ’ (Disagreement 13).
I now return to the motif of appearance in the phrase ‘the appearance of the part of
those who have no part’. Rancie`re’s frequent use of the term appearance [apparence ]
announces both an engagement with and a departure from the philosophical tradition
and its treatment of appearances from Plato to Hegel. For Plato, outward appearances
are mere simulacra that must be deemed false in comparison to the true world of
eternal, self-identical forms. Hegel inverts this Platonic schema by identifying mere
appearance [Schein ] as the foundation of aesthetics and as co-originary with any thought
of the essence of things: the very act of postulating a true world beyond or behind the
realm of mere appearances already presupposes – and thus finds itself dependent on –
the shadowy world of simulacra. As Hegel puts it in the Lectures on Fine Art, ‘the
beautiful [Scho¨ne ] has its being in pure appearance [Schein ] . . . .[And] appearance
itself is essential to essence’. For Rancie`re, however, appearance has nothing to do with
the old onto-theological distinction between the sensuous and the spiritual, or the
sensible and the intelligible, or between what is outwardly manifest and what lies
concealed behind the phenomenon, nor is it the dialectical reconciliation of these
differences. ‘Appearance’ refers to two distinct tendencies that exist in a relation of
aporetic incompatibility within Rancie`re’s understanding of social organization. For
one, appearance names the culmination of the distribution of the sensible, a sharing-out
of the common that shapes what can be thought, heard, said – or what is able to
‘appear’ – within a given regime. At the same time, appearance can also indicate the
presence of a part that has not yet been counted and accounted for by the prevailing
distribution; appearance in this sense names the emergence of an uncanny double that
disrupts the sensible self-presentation of the whole.
Perhaps the closest analogy to what Rancie`re calls the politics of aesthetics is found
in the transcendental aesthetic in Kant’s first Critique, which asserts that the possibilities
for sense experience are determined by the subjective a priori categories of space and
time rather than by qualities proper to the things themselves.3 For Rancie`re the
sensible world around us is similarly constituted by an a priori sensibility that informs
how we experience and relate to one another while also determining what counts as
truth and knowledge. The aesthetic thus distributes space, calibrates time and gives
form to social activity. As sensibility, the aesthetic not only shapes perception, it also
causes sense data to appear as so many ‘self-evident facts’. It thereby renders
imperceptible the archi-political shaping of the sensible. Whereas the Kantian
transcendental aesthetic does not vary through history, the a priori schema for divvying
up the social in Rancie`re is subject to transformation. Rancie`re sketches three ‘regimes’
that entail distinct modes of organizing sense perception, language and social relations.
The first of these three orders is the Platonic ‘ethical regime of images’, in which
social organization is grounded in the distinction between good and bad uses of mimesis
and the determination of what place is proper to whom in the community. The
Platonic polis requires a decision as to who will be allowed to imitate and who is not,
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and thus, by extension, about who is qualified to legislate and who is not. At the same
time, the ethical regime in Plato presupposes a specific economy of time: no one – or
almost no one – is able to do more than one thing at a time and do them well; the
carpenter makes tables while the farmer farms, and neither may dabble in the work or
knowledge of others when not engaged in his own practice. The lone exceptions in this
economy of time and tekhne are found in the poet – who improperly presumes to speak
beyond his sphere of expertise, and who must therefore be excluded from any well-
ordered polis – and the philosopher, who is the only one legitimately able to do more
than one thing: the philosopher both thinks and legislates.
Following on the heels of the Platonic regime of images Rancie`re locates the
Aristotelian ‘representative regime of arts’. Aristotle frees mimesis from the ethical
constraints imposed on it by Plato while establishing new normative codifications and
hierarchies that tie particular literary genres to social classes: tragedy and epic serve to
represent the highest social groups while comedy provides the medium for
representing the experiences of the common or the demos. Aristotle thus brings poetry
back into the community, even going so far as to accord it a higher status than merely
descriptive uses of language. Whereas Greek historical writing merely records what has
already taken place, poetry speaks of what might happen. Aristotelian poetics thus aligns
itself with philosophy in according ontological privilege to possibility over actuality.
At the same time, it also participates in policing this distinction by ensuring a logical
correspondence between generic codes and social distinctions. Poetic theory helps
ensure that this correspondence will, over the course of the following two millennia,
appear as self-evident and natural instead of contingent and subject to challenge.
The third order is what Rancie`re terms the ‘aesthetic regime of arts’. The birth of
the aesthetic regime roughly coincides with Kant’s Copernican revolution and with the
democratic, bourgeois social revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. It makes its mark by abolishing the Aristotelian hierarchy of literary genres,
proclaiming instead the radical equality of subjects and subject matter. As was the case
with Aristotle, literature exemplifies this democratic transformation in ‘the order of
things’. There are two main ways in which this happens.
On one hand, modern literature brings to light and exploits a new awareness that
what Socrates referred to in Plato’s Phaedrus as the orphaned nature of the written word
is in fact a constitutive feature of all language, spoken or written. What twentieth-
century linguistics will describe as the signifier’s radical separation from the signified
(or the view that meaning derives from transactions between signifiers that bypass the
signified altogether) allows us to see a crack in the foundation of the logos itself. By
making evident and availing itself of the ‘orphaned’ status of the signifier, modern
literature from Romanticism forward announces what Rancie`re calls the ‘democratic
disorder of literariness’: language now comes to be seen as a common [matter] that can
be taken up by anyone regardless of their qualifications, and the old connections
between speech, intention and authority thus fade into the background. In an analogous
fashion, modern politics is born with the beheading of the old sovereign whose
authority was derived from blood lineage and from God, and with the proclamation of
a new sovereign that goes by the name of ‘the people’. The democratic sensibility that
emerges with this event announces a new awareness that the language of law and
politics is inherently open to being redeployed and reconfigured in new ways that are
not necessarily compatible with the original intentions of its authors. This can be seen,
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for example, in the appropriation of the political vocabulary of the bourgeoisie by the
proletariat in nineteenth-century France, and likewise by anti-colonial struggles such as
the Haitian revolution which ‘improperly’ take up the ideals of liberty and equality that
had recently been declared universal for Frenchmen.
On the other hand, beginning with realism, modern literature increasingly
distances itself from views of language as instrument or reflection of individual subjects
and their wills; it focuses instead on language and social practices as comprising a vast,
impersonal tapestry that, in Rancie`re’s words, ‘display[s] the character of a time or a
society’ (‘Politics of Literature’ 18). Beginning with Balzac, modern literature tends to
approach and frame its subject matter, no matter how insignificant or portentous, as an
array of clues about social organization or as ‘symptoms’ waiting to be interpreted.
These two tendencies – literary disorder and orphandom on one hand, interpretation
and symptomatology on the other hand – coexist in an uneasy relation with one
another within the aesthetic regime.
I want to bring this discussion of Rancie`re to a close by proposing that his thinking
about politics and aesthetics performs what we could call the poetics of sovereignty
while also illuminating the failure of the logic of sovereignty. This, in my view, is the
fundamental aporia of his thinking. Let us recall, first, that politics begins with the
appearance of the ‘part that has no part’, and that this part speaks in a voice that has not
previously been acknowledged as proper to the community. At the same time, if its
singular claim is to acquire a political valence it must make itself valid not for this
particular part alone but for the whole; in other words, it must universalize itself. This
is what I am calling the poetics of sovereignty: a singular speaking that bears with it the
force of the universal. For Rancie`re, as we have seen, the universal is not simply the
aggregate of parts that make up the whole: it is instead the common which displaces
the self-identity of the whole, opening it up to that which its self-presentation would
repress. Rancie`re’s notion of ‘misunderstanding’ exposes the miscount at the heart of
the social, while also underscoring that this flaw is structural and not secondary. The
logic of sovereignty institutes a calculus of the social that is unable to account for every
part of the whole it brings into view. The very act of codifying and legislating
introduces the possibility of the incalculable, a potential opening for the emergence of a
previously uncounted part.
I now turn to Roberto Bolan˜o’s Nocturno de Chile (2000). My aim is to explore how
the mutual implication of aesthetics and politics can give shape to a strong reading of
the novel. At the same time, I am somewhat wary about the kind of critical acclaim this
novel has generated, a reception which in my view attests to something less than a truly
critical assessment of the novel – of what is truly interesting in Bolan˜o’s writing as well
as of the ambiguities found in this particular work. Nocturno de Chile is the death-bed
memoire and pseudo-confession of Sebastia´n Urrutia Lacroix, a priest who belongs to
the far-right Catholic organization Opus Dei and whose primary fame comes from his
work as a literary critic, which he published under the pseudonym H. Ibacache.4 While
the narrative development draws exclusively from Urrutia’s recollections of personal
experiences and anecdotes, these memories provide a meticulous account of his
dealings with key actors and his participation – albeit frequently from the sidelines –
in key moments in recent Chilean history. This personal memoire thus composes a
tapestry in which the history of present-day Chile can be deciphered and analyzed. The
narrative invites us to interpret not only the key decisions and deeds but also the
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silences, repressions and forgetting that have shaped Chilean social history from
Allende’s Unidad Popular government to dictatorship and, finally, neoliberal
democracy.
The novel’s epigraph, a single sentence – Quı´tese la peluca – taken from
Chesterton’s short story ‘The Purple Wig’, provides one interpretive key for reading
the novel. ‘The Purple Wig’ is a tale of theft and deception, illegitimacy and
legitimization, which recounts the illicit appropriation of an estate and a noble title by a
bourgeois lawyer. It ends with an ironic reflection on the purpose of noble titles in
perpetuating the British state. The words selected by Bolan˜o for his epigraph are
uttered by Chesterton’s narrator, an investigative reporter who has become suspicious
of the imposter’s identity and threatens to expose him as a fake. By the time we reach
the end of the story, however, we can see that this command had already been
inscribed, at the moment it was uttered, in a larger pattern of dissimulation and
reinscription.
The eponymous wig in Chesterton’s story has a long history indeed. The real
Duke, prior to being usurped by the lawyer, wore a wig whose purpose – at least
according to popular rumor – was to conceal a congenital deformity that had cursed
the family for generations, a defect so hideous that it would cause anyone who set
eyes on it to lose their wits. The imposter, who is employed by the Duke as his
financial attorney, deceives his client by mismanaging his estate and leading him into
bankruptcy, after which he steps in and buys the impoverished Duke’s estate. The
lawyer assumes the identity of the Duke, donning a similar wig which no longer
serves to conceal a trait presumed to be socially unpresentable but instead hides the
fact that the imposter has nothing to hide – nothing, that is, except his own
improper social origin. This is the first deception: the wig is a mask that hides the fact
that there is nothing to hide. It thus allegorizes the difference between two
hegemonic classes: the aristocracy, whose supremacy is established by the natural
order of blood lineage, and the bourgeoisie, whose superiority is assured by culture.
Insofar as anyone and everyone can acquire culture through education, bourgeois
hegemony is constitutively unable to establish a secure and stable distinction between
those who govern and the governed. At the same time, could we not say that the wig
hides, and has indeed always served to hide, the nothing? For the nobility this
‘nothing’ was an uncanny trait that accompanied the determination of social authority
and right through divine will and blood lineage: it was the naturalization of authority
gone awry, a genetic defect that associated with the tradition of intermarriage. With
the bourgeois lawyer, meanwhile, this ‘nothing’ is the absence of any essentializable
criteria for determining social class and order. When Chesterton’s narrator finally
finishes his investigative work of unpacking the secret history of this
misappropriation, he also learns that the truth he has worked to uncover is never
to be revealed to the public. It turns out that the English crown was well aware that
the lawyer was not a duke when it authenticated the title he had appropriated from
the Duke. Indeed, the entire social structure of titles and estates proves to be nothing
more than a fiction, an official means of sanctioning and legitimating a form of
accumulation that would otherwise be visible as domination, bloodshed and terror.
We have thus been forewarned at the threshold of Bolan˜o’s novel that the trope of
unveiling or revelation – exemplified by the investigative reporter’s desire to
distinguish between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ aristocrats – is part and parcel of
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the game of concealment, dissimulation and reinscription that accompany the history
of what Marx called primitive accumulation.
Urrutia’s feverish account begins enigmatically by alluding to – while in the same
breath also denying – the existence of unsettled accounts from his past. This ambiguity
is then given a name: it is the one whom Urrutia refers to as ‘el joven envejecido’
(which turns out to be a euphemism for his own conscience or superego) who has been
spreading rumors and insinuations about the priest’s misdeeds. Urrutia promises what
will have been his final words to the task of resolving these loose ends and justifying not
only his acts but also his words and silences:
Hay que aclarar algunos puntos. Ası´ que me apoyare´ en un codo y levantare´ la
cabeza, mi noble cabeza temblorosa, y rebuscare´ en el rinco´n de los recuerdos
aquellos actos que me justifican . . . Hay que ser responsable. Eso lo he dicho toda
mi vida. Uno tiene la obligacio´n moral de ser responsable de sus actos y tambie´n de
sus palabras e incluso de sus silencios, sı´, de sus silencios porque tambie´n los
silencios ascienden al cielo y los oye Dios y so´lo Dios los comprende y los juzga, ası´
que mucho cuidado con los silencios. Yo soy responsable de todo. Mis silencios son
inmaculados. (11–12)
I will return to the question of responsibility in due time. First, however, a brief
synopsis of the plot will help to situate my comments. Urrutia follows this initial
hesitation by taking us from his early ordainment as a Catholic priest to his other
‘baptism’ in the rarefied literary circles that gather at the family estate of Farewell,
Chile’s leading critic. Farewell bears an unmistakable likeness to the real-life
Herna´n Dı´az Arrieta (1891–1984), whose literary column – published under the
pseudonym ‘Alone’ – appeared in the Santiago daily El Mercurio for more than four
decades. Farewell begins to play the role of a second father to the young Urrutia,
introducing him to Neruda and the other leading lights of the Chilean literary scene.
Following a lengthy account of a weekend spent on Farewell’s estate, which includes
a number of significant moments – including a sexual encounter between Urrutia
and Farewell, his first meeting with Neruda, as well as a pair of run-ins with group
of campesinos living on Farewell’s fundo (more on these peones shortly) – the
narrative then jumps ahead several decades to relate how, in the turmoil surrounding
Allende’s socialist revolution in the early 1970s, Urrutia retreated from public life
and buried himself in the seemingly remote and endless task of re-reading the
Ancient Greeks. Despite what his account would have us believe, it is clear that we
are to read this retreat into the classical archive in reverse, or symptomatically as
Rancie`re would say, both with and against Urrutia’s self-interpretation: real insight
into the way things are today can only come through interrogation of the history of
the present, which is to say both the ways in which the past silently persists or
returns in the present, as well as the sense in which the present always already rests
on a certain interpretation of the past.
Urrutia returns from his seclusion following the 1973 military coup. At a time
when many in his social circles were being targeted by the repressive apparatus of the
military state, Urrutia enjoys immunity thanks to his Opus Dei membership, and he is
even invited to teach a seminar on Marxism for Pinochet and his staff. The narrative –
and with it, Urrutia’s life – finally comes to a close in the historical limbo of
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post-dictatorship Chile, a time when all social antagonisms and ideological conflict have
been banished from the national stage.
We can begin to unravel the problem of responsibility by looking more closely at
the final sentence of Urrutia’s memoir, uttered as he confronts the imminence of
death. These last words have the ironic effect of displacing the thought of salvation –
toward which, as we have seen, the narrative had been directed since the beginning –
with the unredeemable image of a solitude that breaches the integrity of the body and
suspends the grammatical unity of the narrative subject: ‘Y despue´s se desata la
tormenta de mierda’ (150). This ‘despue´s’ abruptly suspends the theological
temporality of redemption that had been set in motion with the original promise to
settle all accounts. Let us recall, furthermore, that the distinction the English language
makes between eschatology and scatology, or between the theological science of death
and final judgment and the mundane science of bad literature or shit, does not exist in
Spanish, where a single word – escatalogı´a – performs double duty. While this term
does not itself appear in Bolan˜o’s text, it plays the role of a silent axis linking the
threshold of the novel to the conclusion while ensuring that beginning and end will
never fully coincide.
The approximately 140 pages that intervene between the opening promise and the
conclusion are anything but an ethical act of assuming responsibility – responsibility for
one’s sins and responsibility to the other. What comes into focus, instead, are the ways
in which Urrutia’s presence – in the social and intellectual circles of the Chilean elite,
in teaching a seminar on Marxism to the military junta, and so on – makes him
complicit in what transpires, regardless of what he may have said or done. Perhaps the
clearest instance of this thematization of complicity is found in Urrutia’s account of the
weekend he spent at Farewell’s fundo shortly after his consecration as a priest. While
the invitation is a stamp of admission into a rarified level within the Chilean elite,
during his stay there Urrutia is also twice party to encounters with a group of peones
who manifestly have no part in any such community of letters. He first comes across
them when, having lost his way while out for a walk, he catches sight of a humble
peasant abode. However, this meeting between a Catholic priest and what might easily
have been his rustic ‘flock’ proves to be the antithesis of what we would expect: when
he lets himself into the hut Urrutia is told that one of the children is either dying or has
already died. His response to this appeal for help reflects his disinterest as well as his
abdication of his sacerdotal mandate: ‘¿Y a mı´ para que´ me necesitaban? ¿El nin˜o se
estaba muriendo? Pues que llamaran un me´dico. ¿El nin˜o hacı´a tiempo que ya se habı´a
muerto? Pues que le rezaran, entonces, una novena a la Virgen’ (21).
On a second walking expedition Urrutia runs across another group of peones (or
perhaps it is the same group: his inability to distinguish one from another is
symptomatic of his un-sacerdotal lack of care for the other). He describes this
encounter first by turning to cliche´s about rustic simplicity and reserve, and concludes
by stating that these campesinos appear to come from someplace else and seem to be
residing in an entirely different historical temporality:
Ellas me vieron y yo las vi. ¿Y que´ fue lo que vi? Ojeras. Labios partidos. Po´mulos
brillantes. Una paciencia que no me parecio´ resignacio´n cristiana. Una paciencia
como venida de otras latitudes. Una paciencia que no era chilena aunque aquellas
mujeres fueran chilenas. Una paciencia que no se habı´a gestado en nuestro paı´s ni
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en Ame´rica y que ni siquiera era una paciencia europea, ni asia´tica, ni africana
(aunque estas dos u´ltimas culturas me son pra´cticamente desconocidas). Una
paciencia como venida del espacio exterior. (32)
There is much to comment on in this recollection, in particular concerning
Urrutia’s mnemonic focus on the exchange of glances and the face of the other as the
primary site at which her alterity shows itself to him. I will limit myself, however, to
remarking briefly on the motif of paciencia, which appears here as subaltern affect, as
the abiding attunement of those who dwell within the boundaries of national
sovereignty but who are not visible as part of the whole, not yet seen as fully Chilean.
Urrutia’s explanation of their difference in terms of geography or extraterrestriality
attempts to provide a cognitive map in which the uncanny presence of those who are of
Chile but not fully Chilean could be located.
As an affective accompaniment to the geographic or terrestrial difference that these
peones appear to embody, paciencia denotes a capacity to endure pain, affliction and
inconvenience without complaining, to suffer provocation without responding in kind;
it names a self-contained, unchanging permanence amidst the flux of history. Paciencia
is thus Urrutia’s attempt to personify and personalize the Chilean – but not exclusively
Chilean – experience of ‘uneven development’ in a spiritualist, quasi-theological
vocabulary – though he is quick to add that it is not a Christian resignation that they
display, which conveniently places them outside the priest’s domain of responsibility.5
Paciencia is a marker of absolute difference vis-a`-vis both the Catholic teleology of
suffering and salvation and a modernity whose proper temporality is precisely that of
development, of frenetic transformation, speed and impatience. The innate disposition
of these campesinos would seem to place them outside history itself, with the allusion to
their extraterrestrial origins acting as metaphor for world history defined since Hegel as
the teleological trajectory of spiritual development or self-consciousness. Patience, in
other words, is precisely that which does not allow itself to be touched by the
progressive spirit of world history, and which is therefore resistant to what the rest of
the world acknowledges as the self-evident truths of modernization. Patience is able to
bear affliction and abuse because it resides outside historical time itself. Can it thus be
eliminated with impunity and without ritual?
The motif of ‘extraterrestriality’ recurs several times in Nocturno de Chile, and can
be productively linked to what Ignacio Echevarrı´a, paraphrasing George Steiner,
describes as Bolan˜o’s ‘extraterritoriality’ (Desvı´os 48–53). This term is meant to
describe Bolan˜o’s uneasy relation to any locus of belonging, be it place (Chile, Mexico,
Latin America; Spain, Catalunya, Blanes) or language. For Echevarrı´a, extraterritori-
ality is characterized by a late modern experience of decentering in relation to older,
relatively stable configurations of literary production within the time and space of the
nation-state and its history. This scene with the peones, however, would seem to call
into question the assumption that ‘extraterritoriality’ is specific to late capitalism,
globalization, the crisis of state sovereignty, or what have you. Here, on the contrary,
we see extraterritoriality as co-originary with the affirmation of national belonging, and
as a corollary of what might be termed the infranational status of the subaltern.
Another instance of disavowed responsibility emerges in a recollection that
mirrors the real-life case of Mariana Callejas. Callejas organized a weekly literary salon
in her upscale Santiago home during the mid-1970s, providing a rare gathering place
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for writers and intellectuals during the early years of the Pinochet dictatorship.
Meanwhile, her husband – the American Michael Townley – worked for the Chilean
intelligence services torturing political prisoners in the house’s basement. Urrutia
recounts having attended the salon on occasion, noting retrospectively that certain
representatives of the Chilean literary vanguard were in fact in a disconcerting
proximity to the apparatus of illegal repression and state terror. The truly unthinkable
moment in this sordid affair occurs one evening when one of the literary guests
inadvertently finds his way into the basement and stumbles across a torture victim lying
shackled to a bed. The guest returns upstairs, shaken, and discloses his discovery to the
other guests. The party breaks up with scarcely a word; but then the following week
things proceed again as usual, as if nothing had ever happened. Urrutia first expresses
his incredulity over how the guests could return as they did, and then offers the
observation that ‘la rutina matiza todo horror’ (142). He concludes by echoing the
words of Marı´a Canales, the Mariana Callejas stand-in: ‘ası´ se hace la literatura’.
The motif of complicity appears here with the prospect that while many of the
invited guests may not have had any idea about what was going on beneath their feet –
or had no clue where they really were – yet their decisions to continue attending
metonymically illustrate the way in which an entire society both saw and preferred not
to see. This anecdote takes critical aim at literary institutions in Chile and the rest of
Latin America. It performs a symptomatic reversal of the concept of the vanguard, of
that part that is, in Marx and Engels’ words, ‘most advanced and resolute’ and which
‘pushes forward all others’ while ‘clearly understanding the lines of march, the
conditions, and the ultimate general results’ of revolutionary action (Communist
Manifesto 484). In addition to the jab at the Chilean vanguard, it implicates the
institutional forces and practices that make up what we call ‘literature’ today in Latin
America, targeting the institution tendencies that favor a mode of literary production
which, in Bolan˜o’s view, has contributed more to the deadening of our sensibilities
than to anything else, for example through the formulaic application and marketing of a
‘magical realist’ style whose proliferation can only exoticize and banalize the
experience of the real.6
Bolan˜o’s critique of literary institutions is well known and I will not delve into it
further here. Instead, I want to point out that there is something odd about this
moment in the novel, which among other things advances a cautionary note about
literary aesthetics as such, warning that the routinization involved in the canonization of
literary formulas has the effect of anesthetizing us to the singularity and the horror of
the real. However, in the figure of a torture victim lying handcuffed to a bed, it would
seem that Bolan˜o himself could not have chosen a more traveled, well-worn cliche´ to
exemplify the contemporary experience of terror. It is thus extremely difficult to
decide how the juxtaposition of Bolan˜o’s critical assessment of Latin American literary
institutions with his own aesthetics of the sublime should be read. Does Bolan˜o’s novel
provide an imagistic performance – the torture victim as internal failure of the literary
aesthetic – of the same message it conveys in words? Does Bolan˜o somehow repeat the
very crime of which he accuses others of the ‘post-Boom’ generations, as if to
demonstrate despite himself that literature cannot avoid routinizing whatever it touches,
even when it protests against this deadening of our moral and aesthetic sensibilities?
What if literature’s task were to point us toward the real as that which ordinary
language is unable to signify or that which signification can only destroy, but in doing
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this literature itself proves still to be gesturing? Literature begins when language as
meaning or signification enters into doubt, but literature cannot keep itself pure and
free of the problem of signification.
The third and final scene I want to comment on under the heading of responsibility
concerns Urrutia’s decision in 1973 to accept a secret invitation to teach classes on
Marxism to the military junta in order to help them to get to know the enemy.7 In
reflecting on this moment from the distance of his deathbed Urrutia recalls having faced
an ethical dilemma: did he do the right thing in agreeing to teach the class? Was his
decision to provide pedagogical assistance to the junta consistent with the ethics of his
sacerdotal position? Was it a betrayal of his literary friends and colleagues, many of
whom would be identified as enemies of the military regime and thus legitimate targets
of state terror? As he recalls having been plagued by doubts and worried about the
prospect of his secret becoming public knowledge – and thus his literary and priestly
reputations sullied beyond repair – he finally discloses that his actions did indeed
become common knowledge, thanks to the indiscretion of his friend Farewell. Much to
his surprise, however, nobody bats an eye. The explanation for this is interesting
insofar as it opens up a poetic and rhetorical passageway between dictatorship and
postdictatorship, a crossing Urrutia envisions as a kind of wasteland – or perhaps a
purgatory.
Despue´s, con estupor, me di cuenta de que a nadie le importaba un pepino. Las
figuras hiera´ticas que poblaban la patria se dirigı´an, inconmovibles, hacia un
horizonte gris y desconocido en el que apenas se vislumbran unos rayos lejanos,
unos rela´mpagos, unas humaredas. ¿Que´ habı´a allı´? No lo sabı´amos. Ningu´n
Sordello. Eso sı´. Ningu´n Guido. A´rboles verdes no. Trotes de caballo no. Ninguna
discusio´n, ninguna investigacio´n. Nos dirigı´amos acaso hacia nuestras almas o hacia
las almas en pena de nuestros antepasados, la planicie interminable que los
merecimientos propios y ajenos habı´an extendido ante nuestros ojos legan˜osos o
llorosos, exangu¨es o afrentados. Ası´ que resultaba hasta natural que a nadie le
importaran mis clases de introduccio´n al marxismo. Todos, tarde o temprano, iban
a volver a compartir el poder. Derecha, centro, izquierda, todos de la misma
familia. Problemas e´ticos, algunos. Problemas este´ticos, ninguno. Hoy gobierna un
socialista y vivimos exactamente igual. Los comunistas (que viven como si el Muro
no hubiera caı´do), los democratacristianos, los socialistas, la derecha y los
militares. O al reve´s. ¡Lo puedo decir al reve´s! ¡El orden de los factores no altera el
producto! (120–1)
There can be no movement here because there is no longer any resistance – just as
the dove of Kant’s First Critique would discover to its dismay that it cannot fly through
empty space. The transition (dictatorship to democracy or state to market) is thus a
contradiction insofar as the terrain it inaugurates (in 1973 or in 1989, in this respect
there is very little difference) is synonymous with the suspension of the trans- or the
possibility of thinking someplace else. Here and now is all there is, and thus here and
now cease to signify the experience of place and history, both of which presuppose the
possibility of thinking the present otherwise. This purgatorial vision of the present is
intensified because the political has been redefined – and depoliticized – as the space
of consensus: left, center or right, it’s all indifferent, they’re all of the same family. It is
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an irony of the novel – if not of history – that Urrutia’s recollections of Farewell’s
peones as creatures living outside world history turns out, at least formally speaking, to
be the same destiny that awaits post-dictatorship Chile.
The scenes I have been discussing so far in Nocturno de Chile can be drawn together
under the general headings of literary symptomatologies of exclusion, repression and
silence. By way of conclusion, I now want to turn briefly to a scene that illustrates the
crisis of transcendence or the improper origin of the logos. Literary reflection on the
logos in Bolan˜o’s novel, I propose, introduces the thought of something analogous to
what Rancie`re calls the democratic disorder of literariness as a counterpoint to the
‘post-political’ purgatory that is the apparent destiny of neoliberal consensus. The
motif of the orphaned letter first emerges in Urrutia’s recollections of his entrance into
the seminary, a decision that his father had significantly opposed. Urrutia’s
consecration into the priesthood takes place at the same time that he first meets
Farewell, who soon after enters into the role of a substitute father whom Urrutia
invests with moral and intellectual authority, and whose social prominence – as a
respected public intellectual and as a member of the Chilean oligarchy – provides the
priest with an anchoring point against the social turmoil of the 1970s. The thematic
shuffling of the paternal order and the logos – the displacement of the biological father
and the negation of his ‘No’ by the heavenly father and the incarnate word or logos, and
then again by the cultural authority embodied by Farewell – finds a number of echoes
in the narrator’s own language, as can be seen in this amusing passage:
A la edad de catorce, entre´ en el seminario, y cuando salı´, al cabo de mucho
tiempo, mi madre me beso´ la mano y me dijo padre o yo creı´ entender que me
llamaba padre y ante mi asombro y mis protestas (no me llame padre, madre, yo
soy su hijo, le dije, o tal vez no le dije su hijo sino el hijo) ella se puso a llorar o
pu´sose a llorar y yo entonces pense´, o tal vez so´lo lo pienso ahora, que la vida es
una sucesio´n de equı´vocos que nos conducen a la verdad final, la u´nica verdad. (13)
The conflation of a term of biological and familial relation with a sacerdotal title in
the signifier ‘padre’ is structural and not accidental since, as Nietzsche reminds us in
‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense’, the origin of truth is rhetorical in nature,
belonging to the structure of metaphor and metonymy and not to some natural or
divine mandate. It is the very possibility of equivocation and misuse, of condensation
and displacement, which makes language what it is in the first place. At the same time,
we can see how Urrutia’s relation to Farewell – and by extension his relation to the
cultural authority of literary institutions – is inescapably bound up with this uncanny
glimpse into language’s duplicity, represented here by the orphaned signifier ‘padre’.
All of this is compounded by the fact that in this familial exchange between Urrutia and
his mother the evasion and repetition of this signifier amounts to a traumatic repetition
of the primal scene. The father – and with him the logos – is only symbolically present
in the above passage. Cited, he is thus already dead and incapable of concealing his lack,
which discloses itself as the split within the signifier padre (biological father or priest).
By the same token, the narrator’s vacillation between ‘su hijo’ or ‘el hijo’ brings to mind
the Biblical discourse of Christ, who alternately describes himself as ‘el hijo de Dios’ and
‘el hijo del hombre’. The strange and unexplained presence of el hijo in Urrutia’s memory
echoes the doctrine of revealed religion that has just been infused into the young priest,
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a dogma proclaiming that the divine has assumed human form, that the universal takes
place in and as the particular.
This reflection on the orphaned letter together with the crisis of the logos as
paternal guarantor of meaning cannot be restricted to the domains of literary and
linguistic concerns. The theme of the orphaned letter exposes literature’s reflection on
its own language to an unavoidable consideration of how social orders are constituted
and administered, and how such partitionings justify social relations and forms of
accumulation. At the same time, it also exposes the cracks in the foundations of such
orders, cracks which can become the openings for politics. Language is itself the
common of which Rancie`re speaks, and as common it is both what brings us together
and what divides us – from ourselves as much as from each other.
Notes
1 For an account of Bolan˜o’s critical reception see Ignacio Echevarrı´a, ‘Bolan˜o
extraterritorial’ in Desvı´os.
2 The matter of equality is a central feature of the political in Rancie`re, in part no doubt
because the emergence of the ‘part that has no part’ necessitates debate over the
meaning of equality (distributive justice, equality of economic opportunity, equal access
to education, public ownership of the means of production, etc.), while at the same
time reinforcing the fact that the meaning of equality is neither self-evident nor able to
be secured in a way that would free it from the possibility of other interpretations and
determinations.
3 I am grateful to Brett Levinson (personal correspondence) for his help in synthesizing
Rancie`re’s discussions of the role played by aesthetics in Rancie`re’s thought. See also
his chapter on Rancie`re in Market and Thought for a very helpful discussion of the status
of language in Rancie`re’s thinking about the political.
4 Urrutia’s personal and professional profile closely resembles that of Jose´ Miguel Iba´n˜ez
Langlois, a living Catholic priest, literary critic and academic.
5 On the question of ‘uneven development’ and the ideological problems it poses for
post-Hegelian thought, see John Kraniauskas’s splendid ‘Difference Against
Development: Spiritual Accumulation and the Politics of Freedom’.
6 On Bolan˜o’s disparaging assessment of literary institutions in Latin America see ‘Sevilla
me mata’ and ‘Los mitos de Cthulhu’. Following Bolan˜o’s death in 2003 a polemic was
initiated between one of Bolan˜o’s Spanish friends and critics, Ignacio Echevarrı´a, and the
Mexican novelist Jorge Volpi, concerning posthumous interpretations and allegedly
malicious misinterpretations of Bolan˜o’s comments on Latin American literary
institutions. The polemic revolves around Echevarrı´a’s commentary on Bolan˜o’s ‘Sevilla
me mata’, a presentation delivered just a few days before his death, at a conference
organized by Seix Barral that he attended with Volpi and other Latin American writers.
7 The invitation perhaps alludes to a book published by Iba´n˜ez Langlois in 1973 entitled
El marxismo: visio´n crı´tica.
References
Bolan˜o, Roberto. 2000. Nocturno de Chile. Barcelona: Anagrama.
Bolan˜o, Roberto. 2003. Los mitos de Cthulhu. In El gaucho insufrible. Barcelona: Anagrama.
L I T E R A R Y ( D I S ) O R D E R S I N NOC TU RNO D E CH I L E 1 5 3
Bolan˜o, Roberto. 2007. Sevilla me mata. In El secreto del mal. Barcelona: Anagrama.
Echevarrı´a, Ignacio. 2004. Bolan˜o: Vista desde el puente. La nacio´n (Santiago, Chile), 18
April.
Echevarrı´a, Ignacio. 2004. ‘Por alusiones.’. La nacio´n (Santiago, Chile), 27 June.
Echevarrı´a, Ignacio. 2007. Desvı´os: Un recorrido crı´tico por la reciente narrativa latinoamericana.
Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1988. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Iba´n˜ez Langlois, Jose´ Miguel. 1973. El marxismo: visio´n crı´tica. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp.
Kraniauskas, John. 2005. Difference Against Development: Spiritual Accumulation and the
Politics of Freedom. boundary2 32 (2): 53–80.
Levinson, Brett. 2004. Market and Thought: Meditations on the Political and Biopolitical.
New York: Fordham University Press.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1978. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In The Marx-
Engels Reader. New York: Norton.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1982. On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense. In The Portable
Nietzsche. New York: Penguin.
Plato. 1995. Phaedrus. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Rancie`re, Jacques. 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Rancie`re, Jacques. 2004. The Politics of Aesthetics. New York: Continuum.
Rancie`re, Jacques. 2004. The Politics of Literature. SubStance 33 (1): 10–24.
Volpi, Jorge. 2004. Contra Ignacio Echevarrı´a. La nacio´n (Santiago, Chile), 20 June.
Patrick Dove is Associate Professor in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at
Indiana University. His research explores intersections between literature, philosophy
and politics, primarily in Latin America’s Southern Cone. His first book, The Catastrophe
of Modernity: Tragedy and the Nation in Latin American Literature (Bucknell UP, 2004),
examines the use of the tragic as a topos for literary considerations of modernity in
Argentina, Peru and Mexico. Currently he is working on two projects: an investigation of
the relation between literary aesthetics, technics and nihilism in contemporary Latin
American narrative; and an exploration of memory politics and the history of the present –
including the themes of mourning, justice, truth, confession – in post-dictatorship
Southern Cone cultural production.
L A T I N A M E R I C A N C U L T U R A L S T U D I E S1 5 4
